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Introduction 
Nicolas Sarkozy’s call for the re-introduction of border control in the Schengen Area 
during the 2012 French presidential elections is often explained as a response to the 
threat posed by the radical right Front National. While there is case study evidence for the 
phenomenon of ‘contagious Euroscepticism’ (cf. Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 1; Baker et 
al., 2008: 107; Statham and Trenz, 2013: 139), it has not been ascertained whether such 
patterns hold in a comparative design. This article, therefore, examines whether the 
support for Eurosceptic challenger parties influences mainstream party position change 
on European integration in Western Europe.  
Taking Euroscepticism seriously as a signal of popular discontent towards European 
unification (De Wilde and Trenz, 2012: 14),  this article argues that non-governing 
Eurosceptic parties may provide incentives for centrist parties to shift their positions on 
European integration. Moreover, by putting Euroscepticism on the right-hand side of the 
equation, this article will go beyond the literature that focuses on Euroscepticism as a 
dependent variable (cf. Leconte, 2010; Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008a, 2008b) employing 
Eurosceptic support as the central independent variable explaining mainstream position 
change (Vasilopoulou, 2013). 
Recent studies have shown that the issue of European integration in the domestic political 
arena is subjected to inter-party dynamics. These studies attempt to uncover the patterns 
underlying different salience strategies of parties with regards to the issue of European 
integration (Green-Pedersen, 2012; Hutter and Grande, 2014; van de Wardt, 2014; van de 
Wardt et al., 2014). This article argues, and shows empirically, that such inter-party 
dynamics vis-à-vis the issue of European integration are not limited to the adjustment of 
issue salience, but also apply to party adaptation of positional nature. In this, it follows the 
tradition of spatial theory of party competition first put forward by Downs (1957). Most 
contributions that study ‘contagion effects’ from the fringes pay attention to the radical 
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right, but rarely do they take the radical left into account. With regards to the issue of 
European integration, both the radical right and radical left have made Euroscepticism as 
central tenet of their ideology (March, 2011; Mudde, 2007). Therefore, the present study 
will examine both the radical right and the radical left, since whether radical right or 
radical left Euroscepticism is of greater relevance is an empirical question. Following de 
Vries and Hobolt (2012), this article employs the distinction between challenger and 
mainstream parties. Challenger parties are parties that have not governed before, while 
mainstream parties regularly participate in governing coalitions. 
Relying on data from the Chapel Hill expert survey and Ray, this article demonstrates that 
Eurosceptic challenger support is capable of influencing mainstream position shifts on 
European integration provided that Eurosceptic challengers on average regard EU issues 
to be important. The centre-left is more affected by Eurosceptic contagion as it is 
influenced by both radical right and radical left Eurosceptic success, whereas the centre-
right is only susceptible to radical right success. The finding that positional shifts are 
conditioned by challenger issue emphasis corroborates recent findings that parties 
simultaneously engage in competition on the basis of both position and issue emphasis 
changes (Abou Chadi, 2014) and demonstrate, furthermore, that the two strategies of 
issue competition can affect one another. These conclusions have important implications 
for scholars of party competition as well as for scholars studying the domestic effects of 
European integration. 
The Interplay between Mainstream and Challenger Parties 
Spatial theory as propagated by Downs (1957), conceives political parties as rational 
actors attempting to maximize votes. The basic assumption that underlines this literature 
is that a party’s policy strategy is always devised in terms of its competitor. Applications of 
Downs’ spatial theory of party competition have shown empirically that parties do adjust 
their positioning on policy issues in the face of changes in their political surroundings 
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(Adams, 2012); either with regards to changes in public opinion (Adams et al., 2006; 
Ezrow et al., 2010), or positional shifts and electoral gains of their competitors (Adams 
and Somer-Topcu, 2009). This article assumes that mainstream parties react on the bases 
of past election results of Eurosceptic challengers. Somer-Topcu (2009: 239) has argued 
that ‘[i]n an uncertain political environment, where there are only a limited number of 
tools for political parties to rely on for information (…), one important source of 
information about changing public opinion is past election results.’ (see also Budge, 1994). 
While Somer-Topcu and Budge were concerned with the influence of party’s own past 
election results on policy shifts, other studies have demonstrated the impact fringe party 
support can have on mainstream positioning. Following a spatial conception of party 
competition, either explicitly or implicitly, these studies have focussed on ‘contagion 
effects’ from fringe parties to mainstream parties. In other words, these studies look 
whether mainstream parties adjust their positions in response to the presence or success 
of fringe parties. While overwhelmingly focussing exclusively on the impact of radical right 
mobilization on mainstream positions on immigration issues (Bale et al., 2010; Carvalho, 
2013; Harmel and Svasand, 1997; Van Spanje, 2010), others also focused on the impact of 
green parties on mainstream attitudes towards environmental issues (Abou-Chadi, 2014; 
Meguid, 2005), while again others gauged the impact of fringe party populism (Rooduijn et 
al., 2012) and welfare chauvinism (Schumacher and van Kersbergen, 2014) on 
mainstream positioning. 
While spatial conceptions of party competition focus primarily on party positions, the 
literature on issue evolution and issue ownership, on the other hand, argues that parties 
compete with one another on the basis of issue emphasis (cf. Carmines and Stimson, 1986; 
Petrocik, 1996; Schattschneider, 1960). Schattschneider has argued that politics is about 
the competition between parties on which political conflicts will be translated into issues 
on the political agenda (Schattschneider, 1960: 62). Parties mobilize or ‘own’ different 
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issues and try to gain competitive advantage by emphasizing those issues (Petrocik, 1996). 
For instance, van de Wardt and colleagues (2014) have shown that mainstream parties 
have no interest in putting the issue of European integration on the agenda, since they 
tend to be internally divided over the issue. Challenger parties, on the other hand, can 
benefit electorally from mobilizing on European integration as they try to change the 
terms of competition.  
Spatial theory and issue evolution theory have often been presented as contrasting 
theories of party competition. Recent studies, however, have shown how insights from 
spatial theory and issue evolution theory can be combined in a single explanatory model of 
party change (Abou-Chadi, 2014; Meyer and Wagner, 2014). Indeed, rather than 
conflicting theories, the two approaches reflect different aspects of competitive party 
politics (Meyer and Wagner, 2014: 6-7). This article then not only regards the two 
approaches as complementary, but also considers the interaction between the logics of 
party competition. More specifically, it examines whether Eurosceptic challenger parties’ 
average EU issue emphasis conditions the impact of their electoral support on mainstream 
policy agendas. 
European integration as a competitive issue in domestic politics 
Central to the thesis that established political parties are likely to respond to successful 
challengers is that there is an ideological gap between challenger and mainstream parties 
on the issue in question. With regards to party support for European integration, studies 
observed that while mainstream, centrist parties generally hold pro-EU positions, parties 
on the radical left and the radical right are generally less supportive of European 
integration. Among these studies some explain the fringe party Euroscepticism from a 
strategic perspective arguing that anti-European attitudes are strategic tools used by 
challenger parties to delineate themselves from the political mainstream, either in terms 
of issue ownership (Hix and Lord, 1997; Steenbergen and Scott, 2004) or in terms of 
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positions (Taggart, 1998). Others emphasize the intrinsically ideological reasons for fringe 
party opposition to the EU (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008). In this respect, radical 
left parties voice their resistance to the EU on the basis of its alleged ‘neoliberal’ character 
(March, 2011) and radical right parties opposing Europe on the basis of sovereignty and 
identity concerns (Mudde, 2007 Ch. 7). 
The idea that mainstream parties may be provoked to respond to domestic Eurosceptic 
electoral success by shifting their policy preferences presupposes that parties believe that 
their positions on European integration matter when it comes to voters’ party choice in 
national elections. Several studies focusing on the attitudinal drivers of radical party 
support have established that voter dispositions towards Europe can play a role (De Vries, 
2007, 2010; Gabel, 2000). On the right side of the political spectrum, Werts et al. (2013) 
demonstrated that although ethnic threat and political distrust were the main 
determinants of a radical right vote, Euroscepticism is the third strongest driver. Similarly, 
March and Rommerskirchen (2012) have shown that voters’ Euroscepticism has a positive 
effect on radical left support.  
Moreover, recent studies have shown how European integration has become a relevant 
issue in domestic party competition and that Eurosceptic challengers have had an 
important role in this. While Green-Pedersen (2012) has argued for the case of Denmark 
that successful mobilization on EU issues by challenger parties is constrained by 
mainstream parties’ reluctance to put the issue on the political agenda, other studies, by 
contrast, have argued that Eurosceptical challenger parties not only have the opportunity 
to emphasize EU issues (Hooghe and Marks, 2009), but also benefit electorally from their 
issue entrepreneurial strategy (De Vries and Hobolt, 2012). Moreover, the idea that 
mainstream parties are the only relevant players to determine the salience of EU issues 
has been contested as recent research has shown that challenger parties tend to exploit 
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issues on which there is considerable dissent within governing parties, such as the issue of 
European integration (van de Wardt et al., 2014). 
Moreover, the supposition that Eurosceptic challenger parties have leverage over 
mainstream parties’ EU agendas has been suggested in a number of case studies (cf. 
Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2008: 1). For instance, the presence of the Referendum Party in 
the 1997 UK general election prevented Labour and the Conservatives to ignore the 
European issue (Baker et al., 2008: 107). In Italy, the presence of the Eurosceptic Lega 
Nord and the Alleanza Nazionale as coalition partners between 2001 and 2006 arguably 
facilitated Berlusconi’s Forza Italia to occasionally adopt a more critical stance on EU 
issues (Quaglia, 2008: 65). Based on data on parliamentary activities in Denmark, van de 
Wardt (2014) moreover has shown that niche parties are capable of influencing the extent 
to which mainstream parties pay attention to the issue of European integration in 
government speeches and parliamentary questions. These contributions suggests that 
‘contagion effects’ from the fringes is not limited to the issue of immigration, but may well 
apply to European integration as well. Particularly because mainstream co-optation in 
terms of position and emphasis are often simultaneous strategies (Abou-Chadi, 2014). 
Hypotheses 
When choosing an accommodative strategy, the mainstream party faces the delicate 
balancing act of attempting to lure supporters of the challenger to their party by 
incorporating elements of the challenger’s policy, while not alienating their own voters’ 
base. Yet, the more successful a challenger is, the higher the electoral potential for 
mainstream parties to approximate the position on the challenger’s issue and the smaller 
the risk of an electoral backlash. Indeed, empirical evidence suggests that radical right 
electoral success has resulted in accommodative strategies by the political mainstream on 
immigration issues (Carvalho, 2013; Van Spanje, 2010)1. De Vries has noted that the 
presence of EU issue voting is conditioned by a party’s extremity on European integration 
8 
 
as well as by the extent to which a party emphasizes the issue (De Vries, 2010: 108). If a 
party does not think differently on the issue and does not regard the issue as salient, or in 
other words does not mobilize on an issue, it is unlikely to compel other competitors to 
respond in a positional fashion. As a result, I expect that the higher the vote share of a 
challenger is, the greater the tendency of mainstream parties is to commit themselves to 
accommodative strategies given that it is Eurosceptic and places emphasis on European 
integration. Moreover, if a party does not think an issue is salient, or in other words does 
not mobilize on an issue, it is unlikely to compel other competitors to respond in a 
positional fashion. This allows me to formulate the following hypotheses (Hypothesis 1A 
and 1B): 
H1A The higher the electoral support for Eurosceptic challenger parties, 
the less supportive mainstream parties will be of European integration. 
H1B The effect of electoral support for Eurosceptic challenger parties on 
mainstream support for European integration is stronger when the 
Eurosceptic challengers emphasize EU issues more on average. 
The EU issue is a complex issue that taps into many different aspects of party ideology 
(Maag, 2015). Precisely due to its multi-faceted nature, European integration does not 
align neatly with economic or cultural dimensions of party competition. In this vein, Van 
der Brug and van Spanje (2009) have shown that – on party-level –  support for European 
integration is not correlated with economic or cultural dimensions of competition. What 
follows from this is that the issue of European integration, due to its multidimensionality, 
is likely to affect all mainstream parties, not just the centre-left or the centre-right.  
The fact that general support for the EU does not correspond directly to economic or 
cultural dimensions of competition does not mean, however, that ideological 
predispositions do not play a role when it comes to critically assessing the European 
Union. The radical right and radical left address different facets of European integration 
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and oppose the EU on very different ideological and argumentative bases (Hooghe and 
Marks, 2009). While the radical right withstands the EU based on cultural considerations, 
such as national identity and national sovereignty, the radical left emphasises the EU’s 
economic nature as it laments its ‘neoliberal character’.  
Studies have suggested that as centrist parties converge over economic issues, party 
competition is more likely to played out on cultural issues, while the salience of 
distributive issues decreases (Hooghe et al., 2002; Kriesi et al., 2008). The increased 
salience of the issue of immigration is a case in point. The radical right is considered a 
powerful actor that taps into ‘cultural politics’, whereas radical left – by and large – has 
continued to mobilize on issues concerning wealth distribution. Moreover, recent studies 
have shown how issues put forward by radical right parties, such as the issue of 
immigration, can influence both centre-right and centre-left parties (Bale et al., 2010; Van 
Spanje, 2010). Arguably, the reason is that the traditional centre-left’s clientele – the 
working-class – is likely to adhere to culturally more conservative stances. The same 
cannot be said of the radical left. Far left critiques of a supposed neoliberal bias in the 
integration process may be co-opted by the centre-left (Statham and Trenz, 2013: 139), 
but will not strike a chord with the centre-right.  
Thus, while mainstream parties may be equally vulnerable to the ‘Eurosceptic contagion’ 
in general (Hypothesis 2), this does not automatically translate to the supposition that 
radical right and radical left Eurosceptics hold the same sway over mainstream parties’ 
positions on European integration. Rather, the radical right’s reasons for opposing Europe 
are likely to find broader resonance in both the electorate and among mainstream parties. 
Therefore, the potential of the radical right to induce an accommodative response from 
mainstream parties is likely to be greater than a possible impact from the radical left  
(Hypothesis 3).  
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H2 Mainstream parties will shift their positions on European integration 
in response to overall Eurosceptic challenger support, regardless of 
their position on the left-right axis.  
H3 The influence of radical right Eurosceptics on mainstream parties’ EU 
policy shifts is greater than the influence of the radical left. 
Data and Measurements 
The empirical analysis that will shed light on the question whether Eurosceptic challenger 
party support influences mainstream position change on European integration relies on 
cross-sectional, longitudinal data on party positions on European integration. To the test 
the hypotheses, I will employ on a combined dataset provided by Ray (1999) and multiple 
rounds of the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (CHES) expert survey data (Bakker et al., 2015; 
Hooghe et al., 2010; Steenbergen and Marks, 2007). The data collected by Ray contains 
data for the years 1984, 1988, 1992, and 1996 and the CHES rounds from 1999, 2002, 
2006 and 2010 are included.  
Expert surveys have been criticized for being measures of party reputations (as 
interpreted by country experts) rather than being direct measures of party positions 
based on party output such as election manifestos or media statements (Budge, 2000). In 
particular, Budge (2000: 103–4) argued that with reputational measures it is unclear on 
which criteria the experts evaluate a party’s position, whether a party’s intentions or 
behaviour is considered, what the specific time frame is, and, whether the party as a 
whole, its leadership or perhaps even its electorate is considered in the measurement. 
However, Steenbergen and Marks (2007: 349) have argued that clear guidelines for 
experts alleviate most of these issues, such as the stipulation of time frames and the focus 
on party leadership. Moreover, Steenbergen and Marks (2007: 352) have found that the 
degree of variation across experts is small (see also Ray, 1999: 288). This consent among 
experts can be understood as agreement over the relevant criteria and adherence to the 
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provisions of the survey initiators. Moreover, Ray (2007b) as well as Steenbergen and 
Marks (2007) have shown that the convergent validity of the CHES data with other 
measurements of party positions on European integration is very high. The advantage of 
the Ray/CHES data over other datasets on party positions on European integration, such 
as the Comparative Manifesto Data (CMP), is the fact that the Ray/CHES data includes 
significantly more data on fringe parties. For instance, while the CMP data contains eight 
radical right and 33 radical left parties for Western Europe since 1980, the Ray/CHES data 
encompasses 33 radical right parties and 44 radical left parties. For a study that focuses, to 
a great extent, on such fringe parties this is an important difference.To define whether a 
party is a mainstream governing party, mainstream opposition party or a challenger party 
at the time of the survey round, I rely on the conceptualization put forward by de Vries 
and Hobolt (2012) and employ the data on party status compiled by van de Wardt, de 
Vries and Hobolt (2014). Importantly, the distinction between mainstream and challenger 
parties also ensures that the dependent variable and the independent variables cannot 
overlap. If one were to rely on a definition that builds on party families, endogeneity 
problems could arise – especially when ‘the radicals’ come into government as was the 
case for the FPÖ.  
Dependent variable 
The dependent variable is measured as the change in European integration position per 
year for each mainstream party. This article employs a one-dimensional position measure 
for European integration. This measurement has been selected for both practical and 
theoretical reasons. First, while the CHES data from 1999 onwards contains data on 
specific EU policy issues, the data of the first four rounds of the expert survey (1984, 1988, 
1992 and 1996) conducted by Ray was limited to a party’s overall EU position, EU issue 
salience, intra-party dissent and position on the left-right axis. Second, European 
integration harbours different meanings across space and time (Ray, 1999: 286). This one-
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dimensional coding of a party’s position towards European integration ensures the 
comparability of domestic inter-party dynamics on EU issues, despite significant variation 
among countries with regards to the specific EU issues on the agenda. In line with other 
studies, this article operationalizes the dependent variable as the change in mainstream 
party EU position (Ezrow et al., 2010; Somer-Topcu, 2009; Van Spanje, 2010). That is, the 
difference between a party’s EU position at t=0 and t=-1.  
Independent variables 
To recall, the main independent variables is the change in electoral support of Eurosceptic 
challengers. To be ‘eligible’ as a Eurosceptic challenger, a party must fulfil two criteria. 
First, it should have challenger status as identified by de Vries and Hobolt (2012). Second, 
it should be Eurosceptic. Euroscepticism is defined by having an EU position score lower 
than 4. As Ray demonstrated, all parties identified by Taggart and Szczerbiak (2000) as 
either ‘soft’ or ‘hard Eurosceptics’ have a score below 4 in the CHES data (Ray, 2007a: 
159). Based on these criteria the three main independent variables are constructed. The 
variable denoting all support for all Eurosceptic challenger parties includes all parties, 
regardless of party family that fulfil the three criteria. The variable captures the total 
amount of Eurosceptic challenger vote shares in the current CHES round. The vote share 
variable in the CHES data indicate the percentage of the vote a party has received in the 
last national election previous to the survey round. The independent variables indicating 
radical left and radical left Eurosceptic challenger support are similar, but are limited to 
include vote shares of the relevant party family only. Table A5 in the appendix provides a 
complete overview of the challenger parties. Hypothesis 1B predicted that Eurosceptic 
challenger parties’ emphasis of EU issues conditions the impact of Eurosceptic challenger 
support on mainstream party agenda on European integration. To measure this, a variable 
has been created capturing the mean salience of all Eurosceptic challenger parties per 
country/year. The salience variable is a five point scale, from 0 to 4.2  
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A party’s left-right position is measured by the variable provided by the Ray/CHES data 
indicating a party’s general placement on the left-right axis. To be sure, this variable 
indicates a party’s position with regards to its overall ideological position and is not 
restricted to left-right placement on economic issues.  
The statistical models control for party size, mainstream party status and public opinion 
on European integration. Party size will be controlled for by including the vote share the 
mainstream party attained in the most recent election. Besides of being of substantive 
interest, mainstream party status potentially could drive some of the effects. Various 
studies have shown that a mainstream opposition parties are more likely to respond to 
fringe party pressures (van de Wardt, 2014; Van Spanje, 2010). Therefore, the models will 
include a dummy indicating whether a mainstream party is in opposition. Studies have, 
furthermore, established that parties are sensitive to past election results when devising 
their policy positions (Carmines and Stimson, 1986; Somer-Topcu, 2009) and that vote 
loss determines mainstream responses to fringe parties (Abou-Chadi, 2014). Vote loss is 
operationalized as the difference in a mainstream party’s percentage of the vote between 
the current and the former round.  
Research has shown that mainstream parties tend to adapt their positions in response to 
public opinion of the general electorate (Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et al., 2010). With 
regards to the issue of European integration, it has been argued that parties respond 
directly to voter cues (Carrubba, 2001; see also Steenbergen et al., 2007). Thus, to make 
sure that effects captured in the models are not driven by public opinion, the models will 
control for public opinion on European integration. This will be done by including two 
variables indicating support for European integration in public opinion. As Lubbers and 
Scheepers (Lubbers and Scheepers, 2005, 2010) argue, support for European integration 
can both conceptually and empirically be divided into two dimensions. First, instrumental 
Euroscepticism (or support) concerns public opinion about whether EU membership is 
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generally speaking positive or negative. Political Euroscepticism, on the other hand, 
concerns questions of sovereignty and the desired level of decision-making for particular 
issue areas. The two composite measures for both instrumental and political public 
opinion support for European integration are constructed following Lubbers and 
Scheepers (2005, 2010) using Eurobarometer data3. While the Eurobarometer data is not 
without its critics, it is the only data is available for such a long time span. Unfortunately, 
the Eurobarometer data on political support was collected only since 1989, this means 
that in models that control for political support only the estimates since 1992 are taken 
into account.  
Estimation Technique  
To assess the effect of Eurosceptic party support on mainstream policy, fixed effect 
regression analyses are conducted.  To recall, the mainstream party is the unit of analysis, 
since we are interested in the effects of Eurosceptic challenger support on mainstream 
party behaviour. As Abou-Chadi has argued (2014: 11), the inclusion of party fixed effects 
is essential if one is to make causal claims about the effect of challenger party support on 
the agenda of mainstream parties. All models are calculated with Huber-White robust 
standard errors clustered by the cross-section identifier, the mainstream party. These 
standard errors are robust to both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity (Wooldridge, 
2002: 57).4 This estimation technique is preferred over the use of panel-corrected 
standard-errors, since this method only applies when T is relatively large and larger than 
N (Beck and Katz, 1996: 4). As a result, the following basic model is estimated: 
Δ Mainstream EU Positioni,t = (Eurosceptic Party Support) i,t (Party Size) i,t 
(Opposition Party Dummy) i,t (Public Political EU 
Support) i,t (Public Instrumental EU Support) i,t  i i,t 
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Hypothesis 1A is tested by a regressing the combined vote share of all Eurosceptic 
challenger parties on the change in the mainstream party position on European 
integration. A statistically significant negative coefficient would point to the fact that 
Eurosceptic challenger support has an impact on the mainstream party EU policy agenda. 
Hypothesis 1B is tested by estimating the marginal effect of Eurosceptic challenger party’s 
salience of EU issues on the effect Eurosceptic challenger support has on mainstream 
party positioning. The hypothesis that left-right placement does not affect the impact of 
Eurosceptic challengers (H2) is also estimated by interaction effects for which the marginal 
effects are computed. Hypothesis 3 will be tested by estimating the full model including 
radical right and radical left Eurosceptic challenger parties as shown above accompanied 
by the relevant marginal effect plots.  
Results 
Table 1 shows the results for the times-series cross-sectional regression models. Model 1 
and Model 3 indicate that Hypothesis 1A can be confirmed as Eurosceptic challenger 
support has a statistically significant effect on mainstream EU position change in the 
predicted direction.5 Model 3 indicates that this conclusion also holds when the models 
control for the public opinion variables indicating political and instrumental support, 
although the size of the effect decreases somewhat. Concretely, the coefficient signifies 
that every per cent of Eurosceptic challenger vote share increases leads to a diminution of 
mainstream party support of 0.018 on 1 to 7 scale. The large, statistically significant 
coefficient of the public political support variable indicates that public opinion remain a 
powerful driver of mainstream policy shifts (cf. Steenbergen et al., 2007). In addition, the 
small r-squared indicates challenger success by no means is the dominant driver of 
positional change on European integration. 
Hypothesis 1B predicted that the effect of Eurosceptic challenger support on the 
dependent variable is conditioned by the mean salience Eurosceptic challengers allocate 
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to EU issues. Since basic regression tables with interactive terms do not allow us to assess 
whether mean Eurosceptic salience has a conditional effect on mainstream EU position  
change, it is important to show the marginal effect of Eurosceptic challenger vote for the 
different mean levels of challenger EU salience (Brambor et al., 2005). The most intuitive 
way of representing these marginal effects is a marginal effects graph. Figure 1 shows that 
the mean Eurosceptic challenger party salience does condition the effect of the electoral 
success of Eurosceptic challengers on mainstream EU policy shifts.6 First, it demonstrates 
that the greater the amount of emphasis Eurosceptic challenger parties put on EU issues, 
the greater the more mainstream parties will react to Eurosceptic pressure. 
Second, the confidence intervals of the graph show that only in those country/years where 
Eurosceptic challengers have an average EU salience of approximately 2 or higher (on a 0- 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Independent Variables Δ EU Position Δ EU Position Δ EU Position Δ EU Position 
     
Eurosc. Challenger 
Support 
-0.0210**  -0.0178*  
 (0.00763)  (0.00684)  
RRP Eurosc. Chall. 
Support 
 -0.0247**  -0.0249** 
  (0.00634)  (0.00652) 
RLP Eurosc. Chall. 
Support  
 -0.0211+  -0.0120 
  (0.0108)  (0.0112) 
Party Size 0.00728 0.00676 0.00549 0.00551 
 (0.00791) (0.00741) (0.00614) (0.00592) 
Opposition Party -0.136+ -0.133+ -0.116+ -0.115+ 
 (0.0775) (0.0774) (0.0594) (0.0588) 
Public Political Support   0.646** 0.593** 
   (0.222) (0.218) 
Public Instr. Support   -0.0178 -0.00295 
   (0.112) (0.118) 
Constant 0.219 0.206 0.135 0.113 
 (0.199) (0.172) (0.170) (0.162) 
Observations 477 477 383 383 
Number of mainstream 
parties 
94 94 90 90 
Table 1 Party-fixed effects regression models (party dummies not shown). Standard 
errors clustered by mainstream party (in parentheses). 
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 
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4 scale), the effect of Eurosceptic support kicks in. To be clear, the CHES codebook for the 
1999-2010 trend file states that a saliency score of 2 indicates that the party in question 
finds it ‘an important issue’ and a score of 4 means that the EU issue is a party’s most 
important issue. This finding supports Abou-Chadi’s (2014) argument that spatial theories 
of party competition and issue evolution theories can complement one another are 
constitute different forms of party competition. What is more, these findings show that 
spatial shifts can be conditioned by issue saliency and that, consequently, the forms of 
party competition are intrinsically related to each other.7 This gives credence to the 
argument that spatial theories and issue evolution theories are not just different scholarly 
understandings of the competition between political parties, but that they shed light on 
different aspects of party competition which are by no means mutually exclusive (Meyer 
and Wagner, 2014). 
The conditional effect of a mainstream party’s placement on the left-right axis on the 
impact of Eurosceptic challenger success is shown in Figure 2. As hypothesized, 
mainstream party’s left-right position does not have a substantial impact, although the 
centre-left has a slightly greater propensity to respond to Eurosceptic challenger pressure. 
The graph suggests that the parties that respond to Eurosceptic pressure have a left-right 
placement between approximately 3 and 7, while no effect can be found for mainstream 
parties with more radical views .8 Yet, it is hard to draw substantive conclusions from this 
as the significance in the centre is also determined by the greater number of cases in the 
middle of the distribution.  
The marginal effect graph of radical right Eurosceptic challenger support conditioned by 
mainstream left-right position shown in Figure 3 displays a similar slope as the marginal 
effect graph in Figure 2.9 This indicates that radical right parties indeed do not only affect 
the most proximate competitor. The slightly greater response from the centre-left may be 
explained that the baseline support for European integration among the centre-right is  
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Figure 1  Marginal effect of Eurosceptic challenger vote on Δ mainstream EU position for 
different Eurosceptic challenger salience means 
 
  
  
-.
0
6
-.
0
4
-.
0
2
0
.0
2
M
a
rg
in
a
l 
E
ff
e
c
t 
o
f 
E
u
ro
s
c
e
p
ti
c
 C
h
a
lle
n
g
e
r 
V
o
te
 
o
n
 M
a
in
s
tr
e
a
m
 E
U
 P
o
s
it
io
n
 C
h
a
n
g
e
0 2 4 6 8 10
General Left-Right Position
 
Figure 2  Marginal effect of Eurosceptic challenger vote on Δ mainstream EU Position for 
different mainstream party left-right positions 
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somewhat lower than among the centre-left in Western Europe. As a result, centre-left 
parties have to make greater adjustments to their position on European integration were 
they to approach the Eurosceptic challenger’s position. 
Hypothesis 3 predicted that the impact of radical right challenger parties would be greater 
than that of the radical left. Table 1 indicates that while the radical left does seem to have 
statistically significant influence in Model 2, it loses significance when the public opinion 
controls are included in Model 4.10 In addition, the coefficient of the variable measuring 
radical left Eurosceptic support is considerably smaller in Model 4. This suggests that 
while the radical right has an influence on mainstream party EU positioning, the radical 
there is no detectable effect of radical left Eurosceptic success. Yet, when we take a look at 
the marginal effect graph of radical left Eurosceptic challenger support conditional on 
mainstream left-right placement in Figure 4, we see that radical left success is capable of 
invoking a response on the centre-left.11 This is in line with Hypothesis 3 insofar as it 
shows that the radical left has a smaller effect in general, but when it comes to the centre-
left both the radical left and the radical left play a role. In other words, while the centre-
right is affected by the radical right Eurosceptic support, the centre-left is doubly affected 
as it adjusts its position on European integration in response to both radical right and 
radical left success. 
In the literature, it has been suggested that a mainstream party’s oppositional status 
influences its propensity to react to fringe party pressures. Although Models 3 and 4 of 
Table 1 suggest that mainstream opposition parties are more prone to change their 
positions on European integration, opposition parties are not affected to a greater extent 
by Eurosceptic success as the average marginal effects of Eurosceptic challenger support 
on mainstream EU position change for different mainstream party statuses indicate (see 
Table A4 in the online appendix). 
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Figure 3  Marginal effect of radical right Eurosceptic challenger vote on Δ mainstream 
EU Position for different mainstream party left-right positions 
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Figure 4  Marginal effect of radical left Eurosceptic challenger vote on Δ mainstream 
EU Position for different mainstream party left-right positions 
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In addition, previous research has found that vote loss has an effect on the propensity of 
mainstream parties to react to fringe parties. However, when it comes to position on 
European integration, vote loss on the part of mainstream parties does not cause the effect 
of Eurosceptic challenger support to be greater as shown in Figure A3 which plots the 
marginal effects of vote change on Eurosceptic challenger. 
Conclusion 
This article has demonstrated that the electoral success of Eurosceptic challenger parties 
can provoke mainstream parties to be less supportive of European integration. While van 
de Wardt (2014) established that fringe party mobilization on European integration can 
induce mainstream parties to put more emphasis on EU issues, this article has shown that 
Eurosceptic success can lead to mainstream party positional shifts. Importantly, the 
influence is conditioned by the mean salience Eurosceptic challengers allocate to 
European integration issues. Moreover, centre-left parties are on par more affected by 
Eurosceptic challenger success, since they are affected by Eurosceptic contagion both from 
the radical left and radical right. The substantive reason for this is that centre-left parties 
are susceptible both to distributional and cultural anti-EU arguments. The centre-right, on 
the other hand, is only affected by the radical right. These results are in line with the 
conclusion that social democratic parties are also affected by radical right mobilization on 
cultural issues, such as immigration policy (Bale et al., 2010; Van Spanje, 2010). In 
addition, mainstream party characteristics such as vote loss and oppositional status did 
not have a conditional effect on Eurosceptic challengers’ impact. 
The findings presented in this article have important implications for the study of party 
positioning on European integration as well as for the study of party competition in 
general. First, the findings suggest that mainstream EU positioning is not a static 
phenomenon but, rather, is sensitive to its political surroundings. This implies that the 
inverted U-curve hypothesis, stipulating that centrist parties are supportive and fringe 
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parties disapprove of European integration, is not necessarily valid in the future as 
centrist party EU positions are amenable to shifts. The findings, moreover, corroborate the 
‘constraining dissensus’ thesis put forward by Hooghe and Marks, who posit that since the 
‘permissive consensus’ is over ‘party leaders in positions of authority, must look over their 
shoulders when negotiating European issues’ (2009: 5).  
Second, the findings show that positional shifts of parties in response to other parties’ 
electoral fortunes can be conditioned by the amount of emphasis the latter place on the 
issue in question. This stresses that position- and salience-based explanations of party 
competition do not contradict, but rather highlight different aspects of competitive 
politics. Whereas recent research has stressed that positioning and issue emphasis are 
complementary electoral strategies (Abou-Chadi, 2014; Meyer and Wagner, 2014), this 
article has advanced evidence that saliency and positioning strategies affect one another. 
Additional research should examine more closely how and under which conditions 
saliency and positional strategies of parties are interrelated.  
Furthermore, it is important that we learn more about the complex interaction between 
the attitudes of party’s core supporters and external effects influencing party behaviour. 
Future research should take into account the ways in which the stances and priorities of a 
party’s core electorate towards the EU conditions the mainstream party responses to 
Eurosceptic success (cf. Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2008c: 257).12 Moreover, while this article 
has examined the impact of Eurosceptic success on a positional level, we should get a 
better understanding of whether (the threat of) Eurosceptic success leads mainstream 
parties to adapt their policies pre-emptively. In addition, both quantitative and qualitative 
content analyses should examine how the EU discourses of mainstream parties and 
Eurosceptic challenger parties differ and whether the latter is capable of influencing the 
former’s way of discussing and framing EU issues. 
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Notes
                                                             
1 Akkerman (2015) argues that this effect has been overstated.  
2 In the data collected by Ray a five point scale from 1 to 5 was used. This data has accordingly been 
rescaled. 
3 For 1984 there was no data available for Spain and Portugal. Instead, the earliest available data 
for these countries has been used. 
4 The Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel-data models indicated no serial correlation in 
the models. The ‘modified Wald statistic for groupwise heteroscedasticity’ (Greene, 2000: 598) in 
fixed-effects models indicated that heteroscedasticity is present. 
5 Additional tests have ascertained that the reverse causal relationship does not hold, i.e. that 
mainstream position change leads to Eurosceptic challenger success. 
6 The full regression tables with interactive terms can be found in the online appendix. The 
regression models with interactive terms include all controls but the public political EU support 
variable, since its inclusion would decrease the number of data points. Nevertheless, the models 
including the public political EU support variable yield the same substantive results.  
7  The interaction between Eurosceptic challenger support and the degree of salience mainstream 
parties allocate to European issues has shown that mainstream saliency of EU issues does not have 
a marginal effect on mainstream EU position change (see Appendix).  
8 Most of the mainstream parties with a left-right position below 3 are green parties and radical left 
parties with governing experience, while mainstream parties with a left-right position above 6 are a 
more heterogeneous group including radical right parties, protestant parties and mainstream 
conservative parties. 
9 The regression table with the interactive terms can be found in the online appendix. 
10 The insignificance of the radical left Eurosceptic challenger variable is not driven by the fact that 
the model including public political EU support reduces the number of observations starting in 
1992. The variable is also not significant if the model is specified differently. 
11 The regression table with the interactive terms can be found in the online appendix. 
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12 For instance, when a mainstream party has outspokenly pro-European core voters, it is less likely 
to react to Eurosceptic pressures. The omission of this variable does not repudiate the results, since 
its inclusion could account for cases with limited effects of Eurosceptic support and, as a result, the 
average measured effect would increase (a greater negative position change). 
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